TL;DR
The Quebec Superior Court is launching an AI pilot in a sandbox hosted in Canada, limited to research and drafting assistance and framed by a governance framework that recalls judicial independence. Yet relying on the architecture of an American hyperscaler (Microsoft) exposes three structural risks: (1) legal extraterritoriality (CLOUD Act), (2) attack surface and repeated incidents affecting the Microsoft ecosystem, and (3) techno‑economic dependence (lock‑in) that undermines the courts’ room to manoeuvre. European models (SecNumCloud/“trusted cloud”) show it can be done differently. We recommend a “sovereignty‑first” shift for judicial AI in Quebec.
This article is a response to this La Presse piece: https://www.lapresse.ca/dialogue/chroniques/2025-10-06/bientot-pres-de-chez-vous-un-juge-assiste-par-l-ia.php
What the Quebec pilot officially says
The Superior Court has published a Governance Framework on AI (Sept. 2025). It states: pilot of “conversational agents” for administrative, linguistic and documentary tasks; no assistance in decision‑making, refusal of requests outside the scope; exclusive hosting in Canada in a secure “sandbox” environment; publication of a report in winter 2026. The document explicitly recalls the principle of judicial independence and caution against hallucinations. These points confirm the statements reported in the shared article.
Interim conclusion: the pilot is cautious and well‑marked. But the choice of architecture matters as much as functional safeguards.
Interim conclusion: the pilot is cautious and well‑marked. But the choice of architecture matters as much as functional safeguards.
Where it gets stuck: foreign architecture ≠ jurisdictional neutrality
1) Extraterritoriality (CLOUD Act): jurisdiction trumps geography
Even if the data reside in Canada, a provider subject to US law may be legally compelled to produce data (under certain conditions) via the CLOUD Act. The DOJ presents it as a cross‑border access mechanism “for serious crimes”; Canadian legal analyses remind us that localisation does not neutralise the control exercised by an American provider — at best, there are “comity” mechanisms but no absolute guarantee. In other words: reliance on Microsoft remains a reliance on US law.
In Quebec, Law 25 requires a privacy impact assessment before any transfer outside Quebec and appropriate contractual protections. But it does not abolish the risk of a foreign request targeting an American provider operating here.
For courts, this is a problem of functional independence as much as compliance: the chain of custody of information should not depend on a foreign order.
For courts, this is a problem of functional independence as much as compliance: the chain of custody of information should not depend on a foreign order.
2) Attack surface and recent incidents in the Microsoft ecosystem
In 2023, the accounts of high‑ranking US officials were compromised via Exchange Online; in 2024, the federal CSRB released a highly critical report on Microsoft’s security posture, deeming the attack “avoidable” and calling for reforms. Microsoft says it has strengthened its practices, but the public verdict remains worrying.
In 2024, a global outage due to a faulty CrowdStrike patch brought millions of Windows devices to their knees, illustrating the systemic fragility of an ecosystem hyper‑concentrated around Windows/M365 in critical sectors (transport, banking, healthcare). Even though the fault came from a third party, the impact is amplified by the dependence on Microsoft across the entire chain.
For the justice system, this raises a simple question: can we tolerate a software incident on a private supply chain preventing judges from accessing their working tools or their draft judgments?
For the justice system, this raises a simple question: can we tolerate a software incident on a private supply chain preventing judges from accessing their working tools or their draft judgments?
3) Techno‑economic lock‑in
Forrester (2025) and the specialised press highlight the risks of dependence on the US public cloud: high exit costs, proprietary formats/protocols, dependence on the roadmap of a single vendor. In the public sector, this concentration undermines resilience and decision‑making autonomy.
Microsoft publishes data residency commitments for M365/Copilot and “enterprise” protection controls. That is positive but contractual and operated by the publisher itself; it is not a guarantee against an extraterritorial legal constraint, nor an assurance that the judicial institution can operate completely autonomously.
Why it is also a matter of judicial independence
Judicial independence (individual and institutional) implies that the decisions and functioning of the courts remain sheltered from external influences — which includes operational dependencies on third parties. The Canadian Judicial Council’s guidelines (2024) frame the use of AI and insist: no delegation of decision‑making power and vigilance regarding the integrity of the system. Adding a critical dependence on a foreign supplier subject to other laws creates a grey area between “administration” and “external influence”.
Inspiring counter‑examples: the “trusted cloud” option (SecNumCloud)
In Europe, “locally operated” models are emerging to neutralise extraterritoriality (e.g., Bleu: Microsoft 365/Azure operated by Orange + Capgemini under French supervision; S3NS: Google Cloud operated by Thales, aiming for SecNumCloud certification). These are architectures where the operator and operational/legal control are national, even if an American technology component is used. It’s not perfect, but it is far more sovereign than mere localisation.
Conversely, recent news reminds us that Microsoft has publicly admitted it cannot guarantee the total protection of EU data against an American injunction — which fuels, in Europe, the preference for architectures operated locally (or purely European).
Fact checking (compared to the shared article)
- Pilot use by ~20 judges, assistance with research/drafting only, refusal to handle requests on case outcomes: confirmed by the Governance Framework (scope, restrictions, caution, independence).
- Hosting in Canada / sandbox: also confirmed by the Framework (encrypted data, hosted in Canada; closed environment; public report scheduled for winter 2026).
- Microsoft security context: formal criticisms from the CSRB (April 2024) on the 2023 Exchange Online incident; very tense US parliamentary hearing (June 2024).
- Structural risk of extraterritoriality: DOJ documentation/Canadian analyses (Osler).
Blue Fox position
We condemn the use of a foreign architecture for judicial AI, as it is incompatible with a robust digital sovereignty approach and weakens judicial independence. No matter how cautious the features are, the underlying dependence (legal, operational, security) remains.
Concrete recommendations (that can be launched right now)
- Sovereign option operated locally — launch a tender for an AI platform operated by a Canadian operator under Canadian law (a Quebec‑based company), if necessary under licence from a foreign technology but operated here (like Bleu/S3NS). Clauses: exclusive control of keys, Canadian certifications, isolation/disengagement plans, full auditability.
- “Zero export” data chain + verifiable encryption — beyond server location, impose cryptographic safeguards (HSM in Canadian jurisdiction, separation of roles, tamper‑proof logging), a contractual ban on sending prompts/responses outside Canada, and the right of inspection by an independent third party. (Reminder: residency does not nullify the CLOUD Act.)
- Open and hybrid models — explore a mix of open models hosted in Canada (for low‑risk internal tasks, e.g., reference searches, terminology assistance) and specialised services (speech recognition, translation) operated locally. The goal: reduce lock‑in, maintain portability, and preserve control over the technical stack.
- Judicial independence clause in every contract — expressly state that any service outage, unilateral change, or foreign access request must be able to be contested and defended by a Canadian operator, with a continuity plan that does not depend on the goodwill of a foreign publisher. Base these clauses on the Canadian doctrine of independence.
- Transparency & accountability — publish (at least in aggregated form) access logs, hallucination metrics and incidents related to AI agents, with external audits.
Closing word
The current framework of the Superior Court is serious and reassuring regarding the functional use of AI. But the infrastructure matters just as much: if it is foreign, digital sovereignty and judicial independence remain exposed — through law, through security, through platform economics. It is time to relocate operations, diversify the technical components and reduce dependence so that Quebec justice remains master of its tools as well as of its judgements.
Key sources
- Superior Court of Quebec – AI Governance Framework (Sept. 2025): scope, restrictions, Canadian hosting, independence, winter 2026 report. Superior Court of Quebec
- CLOUD Act (DOJ presentation) + Osler analysis (2025): extraterritorial scope, comity, implications on Canadian soil. Department of Justice
- CJC (2024) – AI guidelines for courts: caution, independence, non‑delegation of adjudication. Canadian Judicial Council
- CSRB/DHS, Reuters, AP – incidents and security criticisms targeting the Microsoft ecosystem (Exchange Online 2023; 2024 criticisms). Department of Homeland Security+2 Reuters+2
- CrowdStrike 19 July 2024 – global outage massively impacting the Windows/Microsoft ecosystem. Reuters
- “Trusted cloud” models (France) – Bleu/Orange‑Capgemini (Microsoft operated locally); S3NS/Thales‑Google (SecNumCloud). Data Center Dynamics+1