Bill C‑2 ("Solid Borders Act"): issues, controversies and call to action

Intro

Bill C-2, which the government has named the "Strong Borders Act," is a sweeping legislative reform introduced in 2025 with the official goal of strengthening security at the Canada–U.S. border. This bill, which runs nearly 140 pages, proposes major changes affecting national security, criminal law and the immigration and asylum system all at onceopenmedia.orgnortonrosefulbright.com. From the moment it was announced, C-2 sparked a heated public debate because of its implications for privacy and civil liberties. More than 300 civil-society organizations – human rights advocates, civil liberties groups, migrant associations and others – have joined forces to demand its outright withdrawalccrweb.ca. We offer here an in-depth analysis of the ins and outs of C-2, examining both sides of the coin – the arguments made in its favour and the criticisms it raises – and explaining why many experts believe it undermines fundamental liberties. In conclusion, we will take a critical stance toward this bill and encourage action, in particular by signing the petitions against C-2.

Bill C-2's stated objectives: border security and the fight against crime

The government presents Bill C-2 as a necessary response to "strengthen our laws and protect Canadians," by giving authorities "the right tools to keep our borders secure, fight transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl and crack down on money laundering"canada.ca. In other words, C-2 aims to modernize and expand the powers of law enforcement in order to address current threats: drug trafficking (notably the opioid/fentanyl crisis), international organized crime, exploitation of immigration channels, and so on. The Minister of Public Safety, Gary Anandasangaree, has himself acknowledged that several of the bill's measures address "irritants for the United States" in Canada–U.S. cooperationopenmedia.org. In exchange for progress on certain files (trade or migration), Canada would thus be seeking to align its security practices with those of its southern neighbour.

Among the main measures contained in C-2, we can note, for example:

• Facilitating access to digital information for investigations: C-2 amends the Criminal Code to broaden authorities' ability to obtain information and data, in particular computer data and subscriber information (Internet subscribers, online accounts, etc.)nortonrosefulbright.comnortonrosefulbright.com. The bill notably introduces new types of orders allowing access to transmission data or information about accounts, including from foreign companies offering digital services in Canadanortonrosefulbright.com.
• Creating an "authorized assistance" framework: C-2 enacts the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act, which requires electronic service providers to cooperate with authorities. In concrete terms, digital-sector companies will have to be able to intercept or provide communications and data on demand as part of authorized investigationsnortonrosefulbright.com. They may be subject to inspections (internal audits) and compliance orders, on pain of administrative penalties of up to $250,000 per violation ($50,000 for an individual)nortonrosefulbright.com. This obligation potentially concerns a broad range of technology companies.
• Tightening immigration and asylum rules: C-2 makes numerous changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. For example, new ineligibility provisions would prevent a person from claiming asylum if they have been in Canada for more than a year (a measure retroactive to June 24, 2020), or if they entered irregularly from the United States and file their claim more than 14 days latercanada.ca. The government claims this is meant to "improve the integrity and fairness of our immigration system, while protecting… the rights… conferred by the Charter"canada.ca. Other provisions aim to speed up removals (deportations), to allow the bulk suspension or cancellation of residence permits on public-interest grounds, or to facilitate the sharing of personal information between immigration and other government agenciescanada.cacanada.ca. These measures reflect the stated intention to prevent abuse of the asylum system and to "deport migrants abusing the protections," in line with a general tightening inspired by the American experiencepolicinginsight.com.
• Increased control at physical borders: the bill amends the Customs Act to broaden search and seizure powers, particularly with respect to goods destined for export. For example, border services officers could inspect shipments inside Canada (warehouses, free zones) if they suspect illegal exports (e.g., stolen vehicles)policinginsight.com. C-2 would also give Canada Post the ability to open mail (letters) in certain circumstances, whereas personal correspondence was, until now, protected from such searchesnortonrosefulbright.com. These measures aim to fight smuggling and cross-border trafficking more effectively.

In short, the official narrative around C-2 emphasizes the need to modernize national-security tools in the face of evolving threats, while insisting that these are targeted measures to strengthen public safety. The Trudeau/Carney government seeks to be reassuring: it claims these changes will respect privacy and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomscanada.ca, and that they will "keep Canada safe" with no malicious intent. Let us now look in more detail at what the bill actually contains and what is at stake.

Expanded surveillance powers: what C-2 would actually allow

Despite the security justifications put forward, Bill C-2 introduces unprecedented surveillance powers that go well beyond mere border protection. As OpenMedia (a Canadian digital-rights organization) explains, "C-2 opens the door to a system of surveillance of every electronic service and device in the country," with no real connection to the borderaction.openmedia.orgaction.openmedia.org. Several key provisions raise concerns:

• Warrantless access to subscriber information: One of the most controversial changes is the creation of a warrantless power allowing the police or CSIS (the intelligence service) to ask any electronic service provider whether a person has an account with them and since whenaction.openmedia.org. The extremely broad wording of "electronic service provider" in the bill encompasses not only Internet providers or telecom operators, but potentially any company or organization offering electronic services to the public in Canadaopenmedia.org. This could include car-rental companies, banks, hotels, hospitals or clinics, online platforms, and so on – in short, nearly any entity that holds a customer databaseopenmedia.org. So, on a simple police request, with no judicial order, a vast range of organizations could be forced to reveal "who their customers are and for how long" in order to assist an investigation.
  Why is this a problem? On the one hand, it amounts to nullifying the protection granted to so-called "basic" data (name, address, account identifiers) that, until now, the Supreme Court of Canada considered to fall within the scope of privacy. In 2014, the Court ruled that asking an Internet provider for a subscriber's identity via their IP address does indeed constitute a search under the Charter, because this seemingly innocuous information "opens the door to highly private information, such as a person's entire browsing history"policinginsight.compolicinginsight.com. It therefore held that a legal basis and judicial oversight are required to obtain such data. Bill C-2 creates precisely this legal basis… but by opting for a general warrantless authorization, which would bypass the requirement of prior judicial approval. According to experts, such a measure "would undermine more than a decade of Canadian privacy jurisprudence" by legalizing what was, until now, considered an abusive intrusionccrweb.ca.
  On the other hand, the threshold required to trigger this procedure is very low: it would be enough for an officer to have "reasonable grounds to suspect" that the information about your account could be useful to their investigation, even if you are neither charged nor even directly linked to a crimeccrweb.ca. This notion of reasonable suspicion is far more subjective and permissive than that of "reasonable grounds to believe" (which requires a more substantial standard of proof) traditionally needed to obtain a warrantopenmedia.org. By lowering the bar in this way, C-2 would facilitate "fishing expeditions" in our personal data: law enforcement could multiply requests in all directions in the hope of finding something, covering not only suspects but also their circle of contacts, witnesses, or any citizen with no direct connection to an offenceaction.openmedia.org. "There is no real check on the spying that C-2 would permit," warns the OpenMedia campaignaction.openmedia.org. Legal scholars predict that these powers will inevitably end up before the Supreme Court to test their constitutionalitypolicinginsight.com.
• Technical orders and the risk of "backdoors": Beyond access to subscriber data, the bill imposes on digital companies an obligation to provide technical assistance that could threaten the encryption and security of communications. The new Supporting Authorized Access Act will allow the government to issue "technical capability orders" compelling a service provider (whether based in Canada or not) to adapt its systems so that law enforcement can connect to them or extract information from themeff.org. Plainly put, if an encrypted messaging app or a secure storage service refuses to cooperate, Ottawa could order it to implant a backdoor or any equivalent means of surveillance. Officially, the law states that it is prohibited to impose a measure that would introduce a "systemic vulnerability" into the company's systems – a nod to the importance of encryption for cybersecurity. However, this term is not clearly defined by the laweff.org. In fact, C-2 leaves it to the government to define for itself what constitutes acceptable encryption or a "systemic" vulnerability through future regulationsopenmedia.org. This opens the way to very broad interpretations. Law professor Robert Diab sees this as a way for the state to "have it both ways" by claiming to respect encryption while reserving the ability to weaken it at willopenmedia.org.
  Moreover, these orders could be covered by secrecy. C-2 indeed allows these technical injunctions to come with permanent gag orders prohibiting the targeted company from revealing the existence of the flaw or even challenging it publicly in courtopenmedia.org. Any legal proceeding to oppose an order of this type could itself be placed under seal, beyond the view of the public and the customers concernedopenmedia.org. In short, a provider could be forced to introduce a weakness into the security of its product, and find itself legally unable to alert its users – even if doing so compromises their data.
  This kind of intrusive measure recalls the worst nightmares of privacy advocates, who fear a generalization of government backdoors. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) notes that "forcing companies to spy on their users" would become permitted by law, as long as the government considers that it does not amount to a "systemic" vulnerability – a vague notion left to its discretioneff.org. The same organization points out that these powers come close to those granted to American agencies under the Patriot Act and the FISA law (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) in the United Stateseff.org. Indeed, a Canadian official explicitly told Politico that the regime created by C-2 would give Canadian police "the same kind of tools that their American counterparts have under the Patriot Act"eff.org. This would include the ability to compel VPN providers, cloud services and various apps to build spying functions into their products, even if they operate from abroad but have users in Canadaeff.org.
• International data sharing and the role of the United States: A significant aspect of C-2 is that it paves the way for a massive exchange of intelligence with other countries, in particular the United States. The bill contains several provisions amending the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act in order to facilitate cross-border data requests: for example, the Canadian Minister of Justice could authorize, on a simple written request from a foreign state, a Canadian prosecutor to obtain from a judge an order to produce data (transmission or subscriber data) held in Canada on behalf of that statenortonrosefulbright.com. This measure clearly aims to speed up cooperation with partners such as the United States, in the framework of the American CLOUD Act.
  The CLOUD Act (an American law adopted in 2018) allows the United States to enter into bilateral agreements in order to access data hosted by providers in partner countries directly, without going through the usual mutual-assistance procedures. Canada is negotiating with Washington to conclude such an agreementeff.org. Yet, according to analysts, C-2 makes precisely "many of the changes needed for Canada to join the CLOUD Act"openmedia.org. By aligning Canadian legislation with the demands of U.S. agencies, the bill effectively opens the floodgates of our data toward the United Stateseff.orgeff.org. Concretely, if C-2 is adopted, an American police officer (from the FBI, the NSA, etc.) could demand data stored in Canada through a tech provider, without the user concerned being informed, and with a confidentiality order preventing the company from speaking about iteff.orgeff.org.
  This prospect raises major concerns: American laws offer little protection to foreign nationals when it comes to surveillance, which means a Canadian would have practically no recourse if their personal data were handed over to U.S. authoritieseff.org. For example, information on politically sensitive topics in Canada (access to abortion, participation in protests, particular medical consultations, etc.) could be requisitioned by American authorities pursuing their own objectiveseff.org. Furthermore, Canada is also considering supporting a new Cybercrime Convention at the UN whose draft is controversial, since it could open the door to data exchanges with authoritarian regimes with little respect for rightsopenmedia.orgopenmedia.org. In short, the data collected under C-2 could end up in the hands of foreign governments (the United States or others) and be used against people who have committed no crime in Canada – including political dissidents who have taken refuge here, whom their country of origin wishes to surveil or intimidateopenmedia.org.
• Various other measures: The bill also contains several other notable components, such as a tightening of the fight against terrorist financing and money laundering (requiring that any business subject to anti-money-laundering regulation register with FINTRAC, Canada's financial intelligence unit)nortonrosefulbright.com, or making it easier to search computer systems (updating search powers to explicitly cover digital data)canada.ca. Taken as a whole, C-2 is a "security catch-all" that, under the guise of strengthening the border and law enforcement, introduces a range of changes affecting our rights to privacy, freedom of expression and the rights of migrants.

Bringing these elements together, we can understand why critical voices describe C-2 as "a multi-pronged attack on the fundamental human rights that Canada cherishes," resulting in "an enormous and unjustified expansion of the power of the police and CSIS to access the data, mail and communications of anyone in Canada"eff.org. The sections that follow will detail the potential impacts on civil liberties, the arguments of the bill's supporters and the international parallels that allow us to better assess its consequences.

Arguments in favour of the bill: national security, policing efficiency and international cooperation

It is important to also present the arguments of those who support or justify Bill C-2 – if only the point of view of the government itself and of certain security agencies. Here are the main reasons put forward to defend this bill:

• Strengthening national and public security: Supporters of C-2 believe that current threats (terrorism, international criminal gangs, trafficking in hard drugs such as fentanyl, online child exploitation, etc.) require more powerful surveillance tools. They argue that criminals use sophisticated technologies (encryption, the dark web, foreign services) and that the law has not kept pace, creating legal "blind spots." Allowing faster access to certain basic information (such as the identity of an Internet subscriber) could, they argue, save precious time in urgent investigations – for example, to locate a child in danger where every minute counts, or to foil a planned attack. Moreover, C-2 explicitly provides that in the event of an imminent emergency (e.g., preventing a serious crime in progress), certain information could be obtained without a warrant, which formalizes in law a practice already tolerated in extreme cases (saving a human life)canada.ca. The argument here is that speed of access to information can save lives or prevent criminals from disappearing for lack of timely evidence.
• Updating outdated laws ("lawful access"): For years, police services in Canada have been calling for a modernization of the so-called "lawful access" legal framework for digital datapolicinginsight.com. In the past, similar bills (under former governments) had been proposed to require Internet providers to cooperate more closely, but many failed because of controversy. Supporters of C-2 point out that the past decade has seen an explosion in the use of end-to-end encrypted communications, which makes investigations enormously more difficult even under a warrant. According to them, lowering the standard of proof from "reason to believe" to "reason to suspect" for certain requests, or requiring companies to retain the technical capacity to intercept data, are necessary adjustments in the face of the growing "frustration" of investigations blocked by the lack of cooperation from private actors or by technologies that are too impenetrablepolicinginsight.compolicinginsight.com. From the police point of view, these measures restore a balance between privacy protection and investigative needs, arguing that criminals should not be able to hide behind encryption or online anonymity with complete impunity.
• Fighting organized crime and fentanyl trafficking: A crucial component of the pro-C-2 narrative is the fight against the opioid crisis and transnational criminal networks. Fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid, causes thousands of deaths in North America. The government claims that C-2 will give customs and police the means to cut off supply chains (by improving the detection of illicit substances at points of entry, by better controlling chemical precursor materialscanada.ca) and to dismantle criminal organizations through information sharing with foreign partners. On this point, it is true that international cooperation is crucial: fentanyl precursors often come from abroad (Asia), and criminal groups operate on a global scale. By facilitating mutual legal assistance (through faster access to cross-border data) and aligning certain legal definitions with those of our allies, C-2 aims to be a tool for a more effective crackdown on these modern scourges. (It should be noted, however, that journalistic investigations have revealed that less than 1% of the fentanyl in the USA would actually come from Canadaopenmedia.org, which puts the "porous border" argument into perspective).
• Cooperation with allies and diplomatic credibility: As mentioned, Canada was under pressure from the United States on various security matters. By adopting C-2, the government is also seeking to align with the standards of the "Five Eyes" (an intelligence alliance comprising, among others, the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and NZ). Similar measures – requiring tech providers to provide access to communications, close intelligence sharing – already exist among our partners (see further on the cases of the American Patriot Act or Australian and British laws). By filling what Washington perceived as "irritants" or "gaps" in our legislationopenmedia.org, Canada doubtless hopes to facilitate agreements such as CLOUD Act data sharing or other exchanges that, in return, could preserve certain trade flows or border arrangements. In short, C-2 is also a political gesture: it is meant to show that "Canada is a serious partner that takes border security seriously," which could consolidate our position in bilateral negotiations. From the supporters' point of view, refusing these adaptations would amount to isolating ourselves and weakening security cooperation, or even risking harsher unilateral American measures.
• Maintaining safeguards and oversight: Finally, the bill's defenders emphasize that it is not without safeguards. For example, although certain information could be obtained without a warrant, this would be limited to the least sensitive types of data (the existence of an account, its duration, etc., but not the content of communications). Access to more detailed information (such as location history or content) would remain subject to a judge's approval, as the government's information letter acknowledgesaction.openmedia.orgaction.openmedia.org. Furthermore, the introduction of technical orders does not mean that every conversation will be listened to: a legal framework (a warrant or a mutual-assistance agreement) will always be required to use these interception capabilities. The bill also provides for penalties for abuse: for example, any unauthorized use of the new prerogatives could be subject to sanctions (even if critics note that genuine ex ante control remains weak). The government insists that it "protects the privacy of Canadians and the rights guaranteed by the Charter" despite the changes madecanada.ca. This can be interpreted as confidence that these measures will respect the constitutional framework and will be subject to oversight (internal or by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, for example, to ensure there are no systemic abuses). It is admittedly difficult to judge the effectiveness of such safeguards until the law is in place, but this argument seeks to ease fears of widespread surveillance by recalling that in Canada, every new law remains subject to the Charter and the courts.

In short, the positive side of the coin, as presented by the government and supporters of C-2, rests on the promise of enhanced security (both at the borders and online), of a modernization of policing tools in the face of high-tech criminals, and of a Canada better integrated into the international effort against crime and terrorism. They claim these are targeted measures that will only target wrongdoers and that a law-abiding citizen has "nothing to fear" from these expanded powers, except a safer country. However, as we will see, civil society and many experts express serious doubts about these assurances.

Concerns and criticisms: risks to privacy, civil liberties and the rule of law

Opponents of Bill C-2 – who include legal scholars, former intelligence officials, rights-defence groups, journalists' associations, technology companies and even parliamentarians from various parties – paint an alarming picture. In their eyes, far from being limited to "border security," C-2 represents a dangerous paradigm shift that could undermine fundamental rights, open the door to abuses of power and alter the balance between security and liberty in Canada. Here are the main criticisms levelled at the bill:

• Massive invasion of privacy: C-2 is decried as "anti-privacy" because it would authorize unprecedented intrusion into citizens' personal information. Being able to demand information about individuals' accounts without a warrant is seen as a form of latent mass surveillance. Even if, individually, knowing that someone has an account with a given bank or provider may seem innocuous, when aggregated these data make it possible to build a person's complete digital profile (where they shop, which online platforms they use, which clinics or services they rely on, etc.)openmedia.orgopenmedia.org. This kind of indiscriminate collection, potentially "unconnected to serious crimes," "opens the door wide to abuses of power"openmedia.org. Unscrupulous police officers could, for example, target activists, journalists or opponents under the pretext of an investigation in order to obtain information about their online activities. There is precedent: in Canada, law enforcement has already been seen using surveillance tools to track environmental or Indigenous activists who had committed no offenceopenmedia.org. Without systematic judicial oversight, the temptation toward political spying or discriminatory profiling could grow. Racialized or marginalized communities fear, moreover, that they will be the first affected: historically, surveillance measures have often targeted minorities disproportionately (such as Muslims after 9/11 under the Patriot Act, see below)securiteinfo.comsecuriteinfo.com. In Canada, Black, Indigenous or LGBTQ+ activist groups could be surveilled for ideological reasons if the barriers fall. The right to privacy is not a luxury, it is a pillar of a free society – without privacy, freedom of expression and conscience is threatened. C-2, according to its detractors, erodes this pillar in an unacceptable way.
• Democratic backsliding and the "surveillance state": Several observers compare the direction of C-2 to that of countries usually criticized for their state surveillance. "It turns Canada into part of Trump's surveillance state," warns the OpenMedia petitionaction.openmedia.org. The allusion to Trump refers to the hard-line security approach of the previous American administration, but the comparison can be broadened. China, for example, requires technology companies to install backdoors for the police and maintains a mass-surveillance system (cameras, data analysis) that has severely restricted the civil liberties of its population. Russia likewise requires access to communications (the SORM system) and uses it to suppress dissent. Of course, Canada is not a dictatorship; nonetheless, voices are worried to see it adopt tools worthy of authoritarian regimes under the pretext of security. The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) in Canada warns that C-2 "appears deliberately designed to prepare Canada to… share data with the United States and other countries," which creates "a surveillance system of shocking scope, ripe for abuse"ccrweb.ca. In other words, we would risk losing our status as a model on human rights. Amnesty International Canada has described C-2 as an "attack on the human right to seek asylum" and a breach of Canada's international commitmentsaction.openmedia.orgaction.openmedia.org. We find here an echo of global debates: how far can a democracy go in surveillance and control without ceasing to be a democracy? Many believe that C-2 crosses a red line.
• Threat to the right to asylum and to migrants: Another facet of the criticism concerns the immigration changes. Organizations such as the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) denounce a bill that is "anti-refugee in every respect"nationalmagazine.ca. By allowing asylum claims to be refused without a hearing on arbitrary grounds (a simple missed deadline, entry by an unofficial route), C-2 "shockingly abandons the rights protected by our Charter and international law," according to the CCR's co-directorccrweb.ca. Deporting someone to a country where they risk persecution without even granting them a full hearing runs counter to the fundamental principles of justice and humanity. Yet C-2 would facilitate exactly that, turning our system into a "deportation machine," to borrow the words of the Migrant Rights Networkccrweb.ca. More than 1.2 million people with precarious status were unable to renew their documents in 2025 because of administrative delays; with C-2, many could lose their status overnight without an individual review and be forced into clandestinity or sent back into dangerous conditionsccrweb.ca. Women fleeing domestic violence, LGBTQ+ people seeking refuge, or other vulnerable groups would be particularly threatened by these expedited deportationsopenmedia.org. In short, C-2's asylum provisions are seen as inhumane and contrary to Canadian values of openness and compassion. They also risk fuelling racism and xenophobia by making migrants into scapegoats (*"as happened south of the border," a spokesperson notes, alluding to Trump's policies)ccrweb.ca. For many observers, sacrificing refugees' rights in this way "to please the United States" is morally indefensibleccrweb.ca.
• Lack of necessity and exaggerated problems: Detractors point out that the government has not demonstrated the existence of a real crisis that would justify such exceptional powers. For example, despite the rhetoric about fentanyl, investigations (the New York Times, the Globe and Mail) have revealed that most of the fentanyl in the United States comes from China or Mexico, and that barely a fraction transits through Canadaopenmedia.org. The myth of a Canadian border wide open to opioids does not hold up to the facts. Likewise, Canada takes in relatively few asylum seekers compared to its population, and there is nothing to prove that a massive wave would justify restricting the right to asylum in this way – on the contrary, irregular arrivals have decreased recently with the closure of the Roxham Road crossing. In the absence of a real crisis, C-2 appears to its opponents to be an extreme solution to an artificially inflated problem. Some see in it a political manoeuvre: to give the impression of acting firmly on security in order to gain economic concessions from the Americans (for example, in a possible trade agreement). OpenMedia notes with irony that Mr. Carney (the PM) has already given in on the digital services tax without obtaining anything in returnopenmedia.org, and that with C-2 "appeasement has to stop." In short, critics believe that we are trading away fundamental rights for intangible promises, and that Canada's security will not be strengthened for it.
• Risk of unconstitutionality and costly legal challenges: Several provisions of C-2 appear likely to conflict with the Canadian Charter. The Department of Justice itself, in its Charter impact statement, raised concerns about the compatibility of certain measures with the right to privacy, protection against unreasonable searches, and the rights of persons subject to proceedingsreddit.com. Legal scholars predict that if C-2 were adopted as is, it would quickly be challenged in court. For example, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has hinted that it would prepare a challenge. There is precedent: in 2014, the Supreme Court struck down provisions that allowed police to access subscriber data without a warrant (the R. v. Spencer rulingpolicinginsight.com). Trying again through C-2 could lead to the same result: a Pyrrhic victory where, after years of costly legal battles, the controversial articles would be struck down or severely restricted. In the meantime, public money would have been spent on legal fees rather than on truly effective security measures. This prospect reinforces the idea that it would be better to withdraw or substantially amend C-2 right now, rather than force it through only for it to be later rejected by the courts. In addition, the legal uncertainty surrounding these new obligations (for companies, for officers, for judges) could create a harmful fog: do police risk seeing their investigations compromised if the law is challenged? Should companies invest in systems that may later be deemed illegal? This lack of clarity is a source of instability that neither law enforcement nor the business community wants.

In short, on the negative side of the coin, Bill C-2 is perceived by its opponents as anti-privacy, anti-rights and anti-Canadianccrweb.ca. It "solves border problems that don't exist and violates rights that do," to quote the director of OpenMediaccrweb.ca. Instead of strengthening Canada, it would weaken the principles of liberty, privacy and the rule of law that form the heart of our society. Critics acknowledge that security is important – "of course it is, and that is precisely why C-2 must be stopped," they sayopenmedia.org – because we do not keep citizens safe by eroding their fundamental rights. A broad protest movement has therefore formed, bringing together groups from varied backgrounds (from refugee associations to cybersecurity experts, by way of former judges and CSIS directors) to demand the complete withdrawal of C-2ccrweb.ca. Faced with such an outcry, one may wonder how Canada got here and what the experience of other countries teaches us.

International parallels: lessons from the American Patriot Act and other surveillance regimes

It is instructive to compare Bill C-2 with similar legislation adopted elsewhere, in order to understand its long-term implications for civil liberties. Two references recur frequently in the debate: the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, and the British law known as the "Investigatory Powers Act" (or "Snoopers' Charter" to its detractors). Not to mention the practices in authoritarian regimes that illustrate how far an unrestrained security logic can lead.

• The Patriot Act (2001): Adopted in haste after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Patriot Act considerably expanded the surveillance powers of American agencies. It authorized, for example, the warrantless electronic surveillance of communications as soon as a person was suspected of terrorismsecuriteinfo.com, access to personal records (medical, financial, library, etc.) without notification or consentsecuriteinfo.com, and the prolonged detention of foreigners without charge and their expulsion on mere suspicionsecuriteinfo.com. These measures were justified by the terrorist threat, but very quickly, voices were raised in the United States to denounce the serious violations of civil liberties. The ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) documented how this law led to mass surveillance of millions of Americans, often unconnected to terrorism, including abuses such as the NSA's bulk collection of telephone metadatasecuriteinfo.comsecuriteinfo.com. The Patriot Act also gave rise to cases of ethnic and religious profiling (Arab and Muslim communities were targeted disproportionately)securiteinfo.com. In short, the absence of judicial oversight and transparency in the application of these powers opened the door to significant abusessecuriteinfo.com.
  Lesson learned? Faced with criticism and revelations (notably through Edward Snowden in 2013), the United States had to revise the Patriot Act. Some of the most controversial clauses expired or were amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (2015), which ended the mass collection of telephone data and strengthened transparency and oversightsecuriteinfo.com. This shows that once an excessive surveillance law is in place, it takes years of struggle to mitigate its effects – and some of the damage (to privacy, to public trust) is irreversible. In the context of C-2, several observers compare the Canadian approach to a belated import of the Patriot Act: "the same kind of toolkit as the Patriot Act," as mentioned aboveeff.org. There is reason to fear that Canada will repeat our neighbours' mistakes: too much surveillance kills liberty without guaranteeing absolute security. And a few years later, we find ourselves backtracking, not without damage.
• The case of the United Kingdom: The United Kingdom adopted, in 2016, the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), a highly intrusive law that requires Internet and telecom providers to retain all citizens' browsing histories for 12 months, and allows the issuance of Technical Capability Notices – that is, the British equivalent of our technical orders – to force tech companies to remove encryption or install means of interception. This law was strongly criticized by privacy advocates in Europe, and some provisions were struck down by British or European courts. A striking recent example: Apple announced in 2023 that it was disabling certain security features for its British users (notably the highly secure iCloud message protection feature) rather than risk having to comply with a Home Office demand to weaken end-to-end encryptioneff.org. In plain terms, the pressure to obtain backdoors on encrypted messages resulted in British citizens losing access to advanced security features offered elsewhereeff.org. This illustrates a paradoxical consequence: overly intrusive laws can push companies to limit their services or leave a market, ultimately penalizing law-abiding users. In the debate over C-2, it is entirely conceivable that if Canada demands backdoors, certain foreign companies (for example, secure applications) will choose to no longer offer their products in Canada rather than compromise the overall security of their users. This would create a technological blind spot for Canadians, or force them to use less secure services. Neither security nor the digital economy would gain from it.
• Authoritarian regimes: As mentioned above, the examples of China and Russia are often cited to illustrate the worst-case scenario. In China, the state has put in place a sprawling surveillance system (ubiquitous facial-recognition cameras, Internet censorship via the Great Firewall, social scoring, etc.), all backed by laws requiring companies to cooperate with intelligence services. The result is an environment where every movement, physical or online, can be tracked, and where dissent is virtually impossible without reprisals. Of course, Canada would never officially condone such extremes. Nonetheless, what organizations like Freedom House emphasize is that every erosion of privacy paves the way for more control and makes dissenting voices more vulnerableopenmedia.org. For example, if C-2 allows for broad sharing with other countries, nothing prevents a foreign government from one day requesting information about a dissident exiled in Canada, invoking cybercrime or some other pretext – and Canada, bound by a treaty, having to comply. Data is the lifeblood of modern repression: it is by knowing your contacts, your social networks, your movements that regimes manage to intimidate or silence opponents. By weakening our protections, we would potentially facilitate this kind of abuse. This is why human-rights defence associations are sounding the alarm: we must not give "the world's dictators" access to our personal information through a boomerang effect of our own lawsopenmedia.org.
• The European Union's approach: Conversely, it is interesting to note that the EU has chosen a different path in recent years, by emphasizing data protection (the GDPR regulation) and sharply restricting mass-surveillance powers. The Court of Justice of the EU has struck down several directives or national laws imposing the general retention of citizens' connection data, in the name of the fundamental right to privacy. European countries of course cooperate against terrorism and crime, but they tend to impose strict judicial oversight and precise targeting of surveillance. For example, in France, the Constitutional Council struck down certain provisions of intelligence legislation deemed disproportionate. This approach contrasts with that of C-2, which is closer in spirit to the very permissive Anglo-Saxon models (US/UK) for security agencies. It is likely that if Canada adopts C-2, this will also complicate data exchanges with the EU, which assesses Canada's level of protection. An overly intrusive law could call into question Canada's "adequate" status for personal data vis-à-vis Europe, which would have economic consequences for businesses (see the next section). In short, looking around us shows that many democracies have refused to go as far as C-2 proposes, aware of the risk to public liberties.

To conclude this international overview, we find that extensive surveillance measures have almost always generated abuses or backlash. The United States had to backpedal on the Patriot Act in the face of excesses, the British are seeing their reputation tarnished to the point of driving away certain technologies, and the authoritarian examples remind us why there must be checks on the power of the state. Canada, which has a tradition of respecting rights, has much to lose by following a slippery slope toward generalized surveillance. The parallels suggest that such a law is very likely to compromise liberty without necessarily significantly improving security.

Impacts for businesses and SMEs: a surveillance climate harmful to the economy?

The audience for this analysis includes business people, notably SMEs, so it is fitting to address the consequences that Bill C-2 would have in the economic domain and for Canadian businesses. One might think that this debate concerns only the sphere of civil rights, but in reality it also touches on the business world, innovation and consumer trust. Here are a few points to consider:

• Compliance costs and burden for SMEs: C-2 would impose new technical obligations on electronic service providers, large and small. A large company like Bell or Google no doubt already has legal and technical departments capable of handling government requests, but what about an SME offering a mobile app or a startup running an online service? If these companies must, by law, integrate interception capabilities or submit to regular security audits, this represents a significant financial and human cost. Setting up infrastructure to store/extract data for authorities, creating interfaces to respond to orders, hardening systems to enable lawful access, and so on, can tie up resources that a small company does not have. The bill provides for steep fines in the event of non-compliance (up to $250,000 per violation for a company)nortonrosefulbright.com, which can be crushing for an SME. This additional regulatory burden risks weakening the competitiveness of small Canadian businesses against their foreign competitors not subject to the same rules. There is also reason to fear that it will discourage entrepreneurship: a tech entrepreneur will hesitate to launch a secure communication service in Canada if they know they may have to weaken its security by government order. Thus, C-2 could have a chilling effect on innovation in the Canadian digital sector, particularly on everything related to privacy technology (VPNs, encrypted messaging, secure hosting, etc.), a sector that is nonetheless booming worldwide.
• Customer trust and commercial impact: These days, users – whether individuals or business clients – place growing importance on the confidentiality and security of their data. If Canada equips itself with a law that facilitates authorities' access to data without strict judicial oversight, this could undermine public trust in Canadian digital services. For example, a European or Asian company would think twice before entrusting its data to a cloud provider based in Canada, knowing that this data could be shared with Canadian and American authorities without it being informed. Likewise, an ordinary user might avoid using a Canadian messaging app if they believe (rightly or wrongly) that the government can easily "listen in." Canada's reputation for privacy protection is an economic asset (we were seen as having a good balance thanks to laws like PIPEDA). Losing it could mean an exodus of certain customers toward competitors in more protective jurisdictions, such as Europe or even toward trusted American services (ironic, but the Cloud Act still requires a prior agreement, which is not yet the case with Canada). In summary, for Canadian businesses, especially those that export technological solutions, C-2 could become a competitive disadvantage in terms of marketing and customer reassurance.
• Reduced functionality and a fragmented market: As we saw with the example of Apple in the United Kingdomeff.org, when a country imposes requirements deemed unacceptable regarding backdoors, companies may choose to restrict the offering of their products in that market. If Canada moves forward with the possibility of secret orders to weaken encryption, one can imagine that global players such as WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram (encrypted messaging apps) or other sensitive services could threaten to withdraw from the Canadian market or to disable certain features there (such as disappearing messages, encrypted storage, etc.) so as not to risk being forced to break their security. This would have a direct impact on Canadian consumers and businesses that use these tools to secure their business communications. In the end, we might paradoxically end up with a Canada that is less well served technologically, and therefore less fertile ground for business in the digital economy.
• A climate of mistrust and productivity: Another, more diffuse aspect is the social climate. If employees and citizens know they can be surveilled more easily, this can introduce a sense of mistrust or self-censorship into professional communications. Innovative companies often thrive in environments where information circulates freely, where employees can exchange ideas without fear. If everything has to go through channels that may be monitored, this can inhibit creativity or push people to adopt workarounds (homemade encryption, servers abroad) that weigh down processes. Moreover, to recruit international talent, Canada touted its respect for liberties: if the image of a "surveillance-friendly" Canada takes hold, this could put off experts (in cybersecurity, for example) who care about ethics and who would prefer to work in an environment more respectful of digital rights. We cannot precisely quantify this kind of impact, but it is part of the negative externalities of such a law on the economic ecosystem.

In short, SMEs and the economy in general have an interest in a legal framework that is stable, proportionate and conducive to trust. A law that introduces heavy technical constraints and casts suspicion on the confidentiality of Canadian services could harm business. It is telling that among the more than 300 organizations opposed to C-2ccrweb.ca, we find not only NGOs but also technology and business players worried about the consequences. Protecting customers' privacy is not just an ethical question: it is also protecting the competitiveness of our businesses in a world where data is a form of capital. Canadian SMEs, in particular, risk being caught in a vise between the new requirements (which demand investment to comply) and the increased mistrust of their customers. In the long run, this could slow our momentum in the digital economy. Conversely, a Canada that bets on data protection could turn this into a comparative advantage (as the EU has done in part). The choice of C-2 would tip us toward the wrong side of the scale.

Conclusion: Defending our liberties and our values – Why we must oppose C-2

After examining in detail the provisions of Bill C-2, the justifications put forward and the many concerns it raises, the conclusion is clear: this bill represents a radical change in public policy that would sacrifice fundamental liberties without sufficient guarantees of benefits in return. Yes, national security and the fight against crime are crucial – no one disputes that. However, as many critics have pointed out, "it is precisely because security is important that C-2 must be rejected"openmedia.org.

Indeed, security and liberty are not mutually exclusive: it is possible to effectively protect the population without establishing a state of generalized surveillance. Canada has, in the past, managed to strike a balance, and it is entirely possible to strengthen policing capabilities in a targeted way (e.g., more cyber-investigators, better international judicial cooperation, etc.) without abandoning basic principles such as judicial oversight, respect for privacy and the right to asylum. C-2, as drafted, goes too far and too broadly. It betrays hard-won Canadian values, as OpenMedia stated: this bill is a "betrayal of our rights and our Canadian values"action.openmedia.org and it "would make us less safe in the end"action.openmedia.org. In exchange for political concessions to the United States, we would lose part of what makes Canada a free and welcoming country.

It is also important to note the near-unanimity of the opposition on the civil-society side. To see so many organizations – bar associations, refugee advocates, women's groups, journalists' associations, unions, tech companies – unite their voices is rare enough to be worth highlightingccrweb.ca. Even former public-safety officials are worried: the former director of CSIS has stated that "C-2 goes too far" and calls for civil-liberties groups to be heardaction.openmedia.org. This broad coalition reflects the fact that C-2 is neither a right-wing nor a left-wing issue, neither anglophone nor francophone: it is a purely Canadian question, about the rights of us allopenmedia.orgopenmedia.org. In every province, in every community, citizens are saying NO to C-2 – because they understand that what we risk losing far outweighs what we hope to gain.

In Parliament, the debate is ongoing. Some opposition parties have already indicated their refusal to support the bill as it stands. But the current government seems determined, at least publicly, to push it through. This is why citizen mobilization is essential. Concretely, what can we do? We can contact our MPs to express our concerns, join the organizations opposing C-2, and of course sign the petitions set up to demand its withdrawal. OpenMedia has launched an online petition that has gathered broad support, as has the CCR for the refugee-rights componentccrweb.ca. Every signature, every letter counts: elected officials must feel that their constituents care about their digital and human rights.

If you are a business person or a representative of an SME, your voice counts doubly. As an entrepreneur, you can attest that public trust and legal stability are vital to the economy. You can argue that this law could harm your business or your customers. Policymakers often listen closely to the concerns of the business community – so your involvement can genuinely influence the outcome.

In conclusion, our recommendation is firm: we must oppose Bill C-2 and encourage its abandonment or complete overhaul. We are not saying that nothing should be done to improve security: we are saying that not like this. Not in exchange for our principles, not by aligning ourselves unreservedly with foreign policies, not by compromising what makes Canada an advanced democracy.

The choice before us is simple: do we want to live in a country where the state can, without sufficient oversight, surveil our digital actions and arbitrarily decide who has a right to justice? Or in a country that bets on liberty, privacy and the rule of law as the foundation of its security? We believe in the second option. To borrow the words of Tim McSorley (ICLMG) at the unified press conference against C-2: "Bill C-2 would allow a massive expansion of domestic surveillance… This system is ripe for abuse…"ccrweb.ca. Let us not let this happen.

We therefore invite each and every one of you, citizens and economic actors alike, to get informed, to talk about it with those around you, and to take action. Sign the petitions, call on your elected officials, support the organizations fighting for our rights. As recent history has shown us (e.g., the mobilization against Bill C-30 in 2012, nicknamed the "spy law," which forced the government of the day to back down), the voice of the people can make a difference. Together, let us make sure that Canada remains "Strong, sovereign, free and just" in the digital age – without compromise on what makes us a free society.

Ultimately, let us say NO to Bill C-2 and defend our liberties civilly and firmly. It is an investment in our democratic future, and it concerns both our values and the prosperity of our society. As the ongoing campaign proclaims, C-2 is "anti-privacy, anti-rights and anti-Canadian"ccrweb.ca; it is our duty as citizens to refuse it and to demand security solutions that respect who we are.

A word from Blue Fox

Blue Fox fully and forcefully opposes this bill, which would have catastrophic consequences for civil liberties in Canada, including the right to privacy. Not only does this program pave the way for a considerable reduction of these fundamental rights, in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but it also seems very transparent to us that it is an attempt to placate the American dictator Donald Trump as part of trade negotiations.

If you share our opinion, you can act today against this unwelcome bill by signing this petition on OpenMedia: https://openmedia.org/Stop-BillC2-fr

Sources:

• Government of Canada – Backgrounder: Strong Borders Act (Public Safety Canada)canada.cacanada.ca
• OpenMedia – Stop Carney's surveillance plan: NO to Bill C-2 (citizen campaign)action.openmedia.orgaction.openmedia.org
• OpenMedia – FAQ: Explaining Canada's Dangerous New Surveillance Bill (C-2)openmedia.orgopenmedia.org
• Electronic Frontier Foundation – Bill C-2 Opens the Floodgates to US Surveillanceeff.orgeff.org
• Canadian Council for Refugees – Press release: 300 organizations demand the withdrawal of C-2ccrweb.caccrweb.ca
• Policing Insight (Robert Diab) – Legal analysis: new search powers and the Charterpolicinginsight.compolicinginsight.com
• SecuriteInfo (France) – Patriot Act: everything you need to know about this controversial lawsecuriteinfo.comsecuriteinfo.com